Lucas Schramm is a political science researcher. Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich.
The European Council recently confirmed that it is very rare to move between France and Germany without consent within the EU.
The French-German dispute has been at the heart of the energy issue in recent weeks. But it is not uncommon for these two countries to adopt different stances at the start of her EU crisis. It is also not uncommon for both countries to criticize each other. Some might argue that the initial French-German differences were a prerequisite for later European compromises, as France and Germany often represented an overall range of member states’ tastes.
But what is disturbing about the current case is that policymakers in both countries are discussing their disagreements publicly and in aggressive ways.
Faced with an escalating energy crisis, world leaders expressed solidarity and pledged common action at the European Council last month. Their conclusions, however, remain fraught with vague and ambiguous formulations, particularly with respect to the ‘dynamic’ price corridor for gas, and essentially force the European Commission to propose more ambitious and concrete measures. I am instructing you to take it out.
Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron even called Germany “isolated”, and in return, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz canceled a planned bilateral ministerial meeting.
What a difference compared to the COVID-19 crisis just two years ago.
In early 2020, France and Germany again had disagreements, this time over the bloc’s financial response to the pandemic. France called for joint issuance of government bonds, but Germany initially insisted on using existing financial instruments instead. Importantly, however, then Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Emmanuel Macron came to recognize that a common European response was essential, not only financially, but also to send a signal of political unity. He has presented a blueprint for what will be the next generation recovery plan for the EU.
In contrast, the current energy crisis appears to be a more complex challenge as it involves several policy aspects, including geopolitical issues and energy security, supply and price issues. Historically speaking, Franco-German bilateralism has always had more difficult times when several policy aspects were involved, as well as the potential to create a greater European compromise. .
In this example, we can’t help but recall the 1973 oil crisis. Conflicts between France and Germany have similarly hampered a coordinated European response.
After the Arab-Israeli “Yom Kippur” war broke out in early October 1973, Western oil consumers, including the European Economic Community (EEC), faced higher prices thanks to reduced production. Arab countries have used oil as a weapon to try to split the EEC, prompting member states to take a more critical stance against Israel.
Making strategic distinctions between ‘friendly’, ‘neutral’ and ‘unfriendly’ countries, the Arab countries imposed a complete oil embargo on the Netherlands as the sole EEC member. European solidarity and oil sharing.
However, Member States were unable to agree on an oil sharing mechanism. Germany, more concerned with securing oil supplies, joined the Dutch call for greater solidarity, while France advocated bilateral agreements with oil-producing countries. He argued that intra-European sharing would only provoke Arab countries and lead to further price increases. , said candidly that Germany has the necessary financial means and is willing to pay a higher price.
Just as today, different approaches, priorities and economic philosophies in France and Germany prevented a European agreement, so striking parallels can be found with the current debate here. And next to energy itself, the 1973 oil crisis also had an important foreign policy dimension.
France proposed a common European front and direct dialogue between Arab producing countries and European consuming countries. Initiated the Euro-Arab Dialogue and advocated a common mandate for the Washington Energy Council. Germany, on the other hand, supported the idea of a transatlantic consumer cartel, as proposed by US President Richard Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. Despite speaking out as chairman, openly supporting the US proposal, Jobert came to view his European colleagues as “traitors”.
Without France’s participation in the US-sponsored International Energy Agency (formally established in November 1974), the continent would be utterly divided on energy and foreign policy.
Of course, the lack of European coordination and action came at a price. Though hindsight suggests the EEC was not facing a supply shortage, oil prices are still quadrupling. Political unity was also elusive. Angered by the lack of solidarity, the Dutch threatened to cut gas exports from the Groningen field to their European partners. And in a climate of distrust, planned integration projects, such as the transition to the European Monetary Union and the creation of regional funds to help poorer parts of Europe, have proven impractical.
The experience of the 1973 oil crisis shows that energy challenges can seriously undermine Europe’s cohesion, and the popular notion that Europe will emerge stronger from every crisis is not a certainty. It is therefore important that Member States, particularly France and Germany, develop a common vision and goals for addressing the current energy crisis.
Europe needs bilateral initiative and subsequent compromise. Concretely, this means a decisive and swift attempt to limit gas prices, which mainly requires Germany to act. At the same time, France should withdraw its resistance to a truly European energy market, and joint purchases of gas would also help, while France would include trans-territorial pipelines.
But first and foremost, the public bashing needs to stop.
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